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Abstract. We argue that none of the existing epistemic logics can ad-
equately serve the needs of agent theories. We suggest a new concept of
knowledge which generalizes both implicit and explicit knowledge and
argue that this is the notion we need to formalize agents in Distributed
Articial Intelligence. A logic of the new concept is developed which is
formally and practically adequate in the following sense: rst, it does not
suer from any kind of logical omniscience. Second, it can account for
the intuition that agents are rational, though not hyper-rational. Third,
it is expressive enough. The advantages of the new logic over other for-
malisms is demonstrated by showing that none of the existing systems
can fulll all these requirements simultaneously.
1 Introduction
In recent years a number of approaches have been proposed in (Distributed)
Articial Intelligence to specify rational agents in terms of mental qualities
like knowledge, belief, want, goal, commitment, and intention. (See [15] for an
overview of some recent agent theories.) There is no clear consensus in the DAI
community about precisely which combination of mental attitudes is best suited
to characterizing agents, yet it seems to be an agreement that belief (or knowl-
edge
1
) should be taken as one of the basic notions of the agent theory (see, e.g.,
[2], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15].)
Since agents need to act upon what they actually know, and not what they
merely possibly know, agent theories must be based on logics that can capture
what agents actually know. Although DAI researchers are aware that the modal
approach to epistemic logic does not capture actual knowledge properly, they
still use modal systems most frequently for modeling knowledge in their agent
theories | for the lack of suitable alternatives. We shall argue that the use of
modal epistemic logic is only justied in some very restricted domains, but for
the more knowledge-intensive applications, other logics of knowledge are needed.
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For the purposes of the paper the distinction between knowledge and belief is irrel-
evant. We use the two terms interchangeably.
In the sequel I shall present a novel approach to epistemic logic which over-
comes the weaknesses of the existing formalisms. The main idea is to combine
epistemic logic with a complexity analysis: we consider how long an agent will
need to compute the answer to a certain query. We shall show that our approach
oers an intuitive solution to the logical omniscience problem while preserving
the intuition that agents are rational. In the next section we shall review briey
the epistemic concepts which have been discussed in the literature and argue
that none of them is suitable for formalizing the informational aspect of intel-
ligent agents. Then we shall present the main intuitions underlying our novel
approach, introduce a new concept of knowledge which generalizes both implicit
and explicit knowledge, and develop formal theories of this new concept.
2 Implicit knowledge, explicit knowledge, and agent
action
Originally, epistemic logic was developed to formalize the concept of knowledge
as it is used in normal discourse, to describe what agents (actually) know. It was
soon realized that this concept cannot be described by any \interesting" logic: it
does not seems to obey any (nontrivial) logical law. From the information that
an agent knows certain sentences one cannot infer what else he knows. It cannot
be reliably assumed that agents know even the most elementary logical conse-
quences of what they knows. To make epistemic logic possible, idealizations must
be made concerning the reasoning capacities of the agents, and modal systems
have been proposed to describe such idealized agents. However, the idealizations
made by modal epistemic logic are too strong for any realistic agent: it is as-
sumed that agents know all logical consequences of what they know, including
all logical truths. Such perfectly rational, logically omniscient agents are non-
existent. Thus, to save modal logic as logic of knowledge, a new interpretation of
epistemic logic has been proposed: the concept of implicit knowledge is invented,
and modal epistemic logic is now interpreted as as describing this concept. That
is, epistemic logic is not taken as describing what an agent actually knows, but
only what is implicitly represented in his information state, i.e., what logically
follows from his actual knowledge. What an agent actually knows is called his
explicit knowledge.
From the viewpoint of agent theories, actual (explicit) knowledge is clearly
more important than implicit knowledge: it is the former kind of knowledge
that agents can act upon, but not the latter. The mere implicit knowledge that
some path connecting all towns in a region is the shortest one is useless for a
traveling salesman who seeks to maximize his prot | he must make this implicit
knowledge explicit in order to choose what path to travel. The mere implicit
knowledge that a certain strategy leads to victory is useless for a chess player
who must make the next move within a short time. An information agent whose
knowledge is represented as a knowledge base must normally make complex and
time-consuming inferences before he can answer a query.
Because of the importance of explicit knowledge for agents' action, the search
for logics of explicit knowledge still continues, and a number of systems have been
proposed for that purpose. (For overviews and discussions see, e.g., [4] and [7,
Chapter 9].) Although the concrete solutions are very dierent, the main strat-
egy is the same in most cases: the reasoning capacities of agents are restricted
by some ad hoc postulates. Most approaches following this strategy can in fact
avoid logical omniscience to some extent, and logics of explicit knowledge can be
constructed, which, like Eberle's system ([5]), can even \[provide] for total igno-
ramusses (ones who knows nothing), complete idiots (ones who cannot draw even
the most elementary inferences), and ultimate fools (ones who believe nothing
but contradictions) . . . "
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.
Why are modal epistemic logics still widely used in agent theories despite
the facts that implicit knowledge is useless when agents need to act and logics
of explicit knowledge are readily available? The answer is simple: because we
want to model rational, intelligent agents, and not \complete idiots". Logics
of explicit knowledge avoid logical omniscience, but they cannot oer anything
what can account for the rationality of agents. Surely agents are not perfectly
rational, yet they are rational. Facing the dilemma between \perfectly rational
agents" and \complete idiots", agent theorists understandably opt for the former
and use logics of implicit knowledge for modeling their agents, hoping that such
logics can describe \almost correctly" what agents actually know.
The assumption underlying the use of modal epistemic logics may be justied
in some simple domains (\small worlds", \toy examples"), where the reasoning
tasks involved are quite simple, where the decision process is not very complex,
or when the time available is unlimited. In such simple domains, it can be as-
sumed that whenever an agent needs some (implicitly available) information, he
can perform the necessary inferences to have the information explicitly. However,
such an assumption is not justied in more complex applications. Agents nor-
mally have to act under tight time constraints, their decisions what actions to be
performed depend heavily on their actual knowledge, and the reasoning needed
for making correct choices can be very complex and time-consuming. Take the
aforementioned examples: calculating the shortest tour linking all towns in a
region, computing the winning strategy in chess, and inferring the answer to a
query from a given database are all very hard problems. It is obvious that modal
epistemic logics and other logics of implicit knowledge cannot describe correctly
what agents actually know in such applications. To describe agents realistically
in knowledge-intensive applications, we simply need other logics of knowledge.
What properties should a logic of knowledge have if it is to be useful for de-
scribing realistic, implementable agents? The rst obvious requirement is that it
2
Other logics of explicit knowledge could be developed, e.g., within the \impossible
worlds" framework ([10]) or by using an \awareness lter" ([6]). Strictly speaking,
Levesque's logic of \explicit" belief ([9]) and Konolige's deduction model ([8]) must
be viewed as logics of implicit belief, because what is believed by an agent in these
models is not immediately available to the agent, but must be inferred using some
(classical or relevant, complete or incomplete) deduction mechanism.
must not suer from the LOP. However, solving the LOP does not automatically
make a logic suitable for reasoning about knowledge. There are other require-
ments that the logic must fulll. It is important that the logic can do justice to
the intuition that agents are rational: although the agents do not automatically
know all consequences of their knowledge, they are in principle able to do so.
Because of this rationality the agents are able to act upon their knowledge: they
can answer questions based on their knowledge, they can plan their actions in
advance, they can predict what other agents can and will do, and so on. If a logic
cannot account for the agents' rationality, then there is hardly any justication
at all to call it a logic of knowledge. Another important requirement is that the
logic be expressive enough to formalize \interesting" situations. This condition
must remain somewhat vague, because dierent applications will require dier-
ent expressive powers of the logic. However, we should keep in mind that the
complexity of a logic generally increases with its expressive power, so we must
try to nd a good trade-o between expressiveness and simplicity.
3 Knowledge, reasoning, and time
The existing systems of epistemic logic try to deal with either implicit knowledge
or explicit knowledge. The former concept is not very helpful when agents must
act, while the latter is not governed by any non-trivial logic. To develop useful
alternatives to existing epistemic logics we suggest to consider another notion of
knowledge. The main intuition is the following. An agent's action depends not
only on what he knows now, but also on what he can infer within some specic
amount of time (intuitively, the time within which a decision must be made |
a classical example being the time available to make the next move in chess.)
An agent may not know a sentence now, but he may possess a procedure to
'prove' that sentence within a certain amount of time, where the amount of time
needed depends on the complexity of the sentence, the agent's reasoning power,
etc. If an agent knows that another agent must act under some time constraint,
he may infer what the second agent can or cannot know within this constraint
and predict his action accordingly. Therefore, it is worth considering what the
agents can know within 1; 2; 3; : : : time units, and not just what they currently
know, i.e., what they know within 0 unit of time.
We want to represent not only what agents know or can know, but also when
they are expected to know what they can know. The rst question is answered
by specifying the logic used by agents in their reasoning, and the second by
a complexity analysis. What time structure do we need in modeling that kind
of knowledge? Temporal logics have been dealing with linear and branching,
point-based and interval-based, qualitative and quantitative time structures. Our
obvious choice is a point-based, linear structure with a metric dened on it,
because temporal constraints are usually given in quantitative terms and over
a linear time line. For simplicity we assume time to be isomorph to the natural
numbers (with the usual ordering and metric.)
The language we consider extends the usual language of the propositional
calculus by n two-place knowledge operators K
1
; : : : ;K
n
, each for one agent,
such that K
x
i
 is a formula whenever x is a natural number and  is a formula.
The formula K
x
i
 can be read \agent i knows  within x units of time" and is
interpreted: \if agent i chooses to 'derive'  from his current knowledge, then
after at most x time units he will succeed", or alternatively, \if asked about
, i is able to derive reliably the answer 'yes' within x units of time". That
is, we require not only that i has at least one procedure to 'prove' , but also
that i be able to choose the correct procedure leading to  under the given time
constraint, namely, to arrive at the conclusion  after at most x time units
3
. The
word 'prove' (or 'derive') should not be interpreted too narrowly as 'deductive
proof': the procedure to gain the knowledge of  may be any acceptable method,
e.g., sensing the environment, looking up in a standard reference book, or asking
some expert.
Formally, our language is dened as follows:
Denition 1. Let N be the set of natural numbers and V ar be a set of number
variables. Let Agent be a nite set of agents and At be a countably innite set
of atomic formulae.
1. The set of temporal terms is the least set Term such that N  Term,
V ar  Term, and t
1
; t
2
2 Term implies t
1
+ t
2
2 Term
2. The set of formulae is the least set Fml such that At  Fml, f; g  Fml
implies f:;  ^ g  Fml, x 2 V ar and  2 Fml imply 8x 2 Fml, and
i 2 Agent, t 2 Term,  2 Fml imply K
t
i
 2 Fml.
The other propositional connectives (_;!) and the existential quantiers (9)
are dened as usual.
Our notion of knowledge could be called \algorithmic knowledge": knowledge
is tied up with an algorithm to establish it. But the term should be used with
care: \algorithmic knowledge" has been used with dierent meanings elsewhere
([1], [7]). In our framework, \i knows  explicitly" can be dened as K
0
i
. Im-
plicit knowledge can be dened as what follows logically from explicit knowledge
(relative to some suitable logic.) Another useful concept of implicit knowledge
can be dened as what can be reliably established by the agent: \i knows 
implicitly" means 9xK
x
i
. The rationality of agents is expressed through two
capacities: rst, the ability to draw logical consequences from what is already
known, and second, the ability to compute the complexities of certain reasoning
problems in order to infer when something can be known. Note that these too
capacities are implementable. It turns out that we can develop quite rich theories
of the notion of knowledge we have introduced.
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This reading does not imply that agent i will know  at time t
now
+ n, where t
now
is the current time. If the agent is not asked to provide the information , then she
has no reason to waste her resources in order to nd a useless answer: The aspect of
goal-directedness is implicit in our concept of knowledge.
To develop logics of algorithmic knowledge we try to establish logical rela-
tionships among the formulae of the language we have dened. This is done by
developing our earlier framework ([3], [4]) a step further. In [3] and [4] we have
suggested a new approach to epistemic logic which overcomes the drawbacks of
existing approaches. The idea is to consider the evolution of one's knowledge
over time: at one moment an agent may or may not know (explicitly) a certain
consequence of his knowledge; however, he can perform some reasoning steps to
know it at some moment in the future. We have argued that the traditional ap-
proaches fail to capture the concept of actual knowledge correctly because they
do not take the cost of inferring new information into account: they assume that
whenever an agent knows all premises of a valid inference rule then she auto-
matically knows the conclusion. We have shown that axioms for epistemic logics
must have the form: \if the agent knows all premises of a valid inference rule, and
if she performs the correct inference step, then she will know the conclusion".
Following this idea we have developed logics that can solve all forms of the logi-
cal omniscience problem and at the same time can account for the intuition that
agents are rational beings. However, the systems presented (and indicated) in [3]
and [4] have too little expressive power: they are not able to describe situations
where introspective reasoning or reasoning about the reasoning of other agents is
required. Moreover, they are based on a non-metrical branching time structure,
which makes it very dicult to deal with time constrains. These problems are
avoided in the present paper.
Our logics of knowledge will be built up step by step from some basis logic. We
shall take classical logic as our basis logic. As we assume the natural numbers
as our time structure, we shall also assume some laws of number theory. For
our purposes it suces to assume Presburger arithmetic (i.e., additive number
theory.) Our epistemic systems will be obtained by adding (proper) epistemic
laws to this basis. Now let us see how such laws may look like.
Suppose that an agent i knows  within x units of time, i.e., he needs x
time units to infer  if needed. Then it is plausible to assume that he is able
to do it when even more time is available. So we can take as axiom all ground
instances of the formula K
x
i
 ! K
y
i
, where x < y. Note that this axiom does
not say that knowledge is persistent in the sense that once established it will be
available henceforth. In this aspect our present approach makes a more realistic
assumption than the persistence axiom in [4].
Now let us assume that an agent i knows explicitly 
1
; : : : ; 
n
and that

1
^ : : : ^ 
n
!  is valid (i.e.,  follows logically from the premises 
1
; : : : ; 
n
).
What can be said about agent i's information state? Of course we cannot as-
sume that i knows  automatically, even if  can be deduced from 
1
; : : : ; 
n
algorithmically: perhaps i just does not care about  and does not even try to
prove it. If he wants to know  then he has to perform some inferences, which
can be very hard and time-consuming. His reasoning takes some time, so we
can only say reliably that he will know  after some time if he chooses to de-
rive it: 9xK
x
i
. So, if 
1
^ : : : ^ 
n
!  is a theorem then we can assume that
K
0
i

1
^ : : : ^K
0
i

n
! 9xK
x
i
 is valid.
In the preceding paragraph we have considered the case when the premises

1
; : : : ; 
n
are explicitly available to the agent, so that he can use them imme-
diately to derive the conclusion . Consider now the more general case where
the premises 
1
; : : : ; 
n
are not immediately available but need to be inferred
separately, i.e., K
x
1
i

1
; : : : ;K
x
n
i

n
for some x
1
; : : : ; x
n
. Because x
j
< x
1
+
: : : + x
n
for all j = 1; : : : ; n we may assume that i can derive every premise
within x
1
+ : : : + x
n
units of time. Once the premises are available they can
be used to infer the conclusion . Thus, it is plausible to adopt the principle
9x
1
K
x
1
i

1
; : : : ; 9x
n
K
x
n
i

n
! 9yK
y
i
, provided that 
1
^ : : : ^ 
n
!  is valid.
As a special case of this general principle we have the axiom 9xK
x
i
 ^
9yK
y
i
( ! ) ! 9zK
z
i
, which say that agent i can use modus ponens in
his reasoning: if he can derive both  and !  then he is also able to derive .
Another special case allows us to infer 9xK
x
i
 from . This inference rule says
that all logical truths can in principle be known, though they are not known
immediately as required by modal epistemic logic. We shall use this inference
rule and the mentioned axiom schema to axiomatize our basic logic.
Denition 2. The logic LAK0 (Logic of Algorithmic Knowledge) consists of
all propositional tautologies (in the language Fml), the theory of Presburger
arithmetic (with respect to the numerical part of the language), and the following
axioms and rules of inference:
KA1. 9xK
x
i
 ^ 9yK
y
i
( ! )! 9zK
z
i

KA2. K
x
i
 ! K
y
i
, for all pairs x; y such that x < y.
KR. From  infer 9xK
x
i

MP. From  and !  infer 
The notions of a proof, of theoremhood etc. are dened as usual.
It is easy to see that LAK0 is consistent and that it solves all variants of
the logical omniscience problem. To see this it suces to observe that the set
f:K
0
i
j 2 Fmlg is consistent with LAK0, i.e., LAK0 can describe agents who
(at some of their information states) know nothing explicitly. (However, they
always know something implicitly.) Likewise, it is easy to see that what an agent
explicitly knows (i.e., what she knows in 0 unit of time) needs not be closed under
logical consequences or even under any logical law, e.g.,K
0
i
^K
0
i
( ! )^:K
0
i

is perfectly LAK0-consistent. On the other hand, agents described by our logic
are rational: they can draw all logical consequences of their knowledge if the
necessary resources are available, as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 3. The following rule of inference is valid:
 ! 
9xK
x
i
! 9yK
y
i

In particular, from  !  one can infer K
0
i
! 9xK
x
i
.
Proof. Suppose that !  is a theorem. By (KR) we can infer 9zK
z
i
( ! ).
The formula 9zK
z
i
( ! ) ! (9xK
x
i
 ! 9yK
y
i
) is equivalent to (KA1) and
is therefore a theorem of LAK0. Applying modus ponens we get the desired
result.
4 Knowledge and complexity
Now we have developed LAK0, a basic logic of algorithmic knowledge which can
account for rational, but not hyper-rational agents. The set of LAK0-theorems
is recursively enumerable and so can be generated algorithmically. If  follows
from  and an agent i knows  then he can employ a theorem prover for LAK0
to deduce , so he will know  after some time.
But how long will the agent need to infer a formula which follows logically
from his knowledge base? Recall that our aim is to represent not only what
agents know or can know, but also when they are expected to know what they
can know. Our analyses up to now can only answer the rst question. To answer
the the second question, a complexity analysis is needed. The underlying idea is
simple: if an agent i receives a query of length l and the complexity of computing
answers to queries of that class is a function f , then after at most c
i
f(l) units
of time he is expected to have the answer, where c
i
is a number that measures
the computation speed of i.
It is still an open question what is the exact complexity of the decision prob-
lem for LAK0. It is well-known that Presburger arithmetic is decidable, but we
still do not know whether or not the system LAK0 is decidable. Therefore a
complexity analysis for the whole system LAK0 seems to be impossible. How-
ever, there are problem classes which can be expressed in LAK0 and whose
complexities are known. Hence we can analyze such problems and estimate the
amount of time an agent would need to infer some piece of information. With
the help of complexity theory we can obtain epistemic principles for specic
problem classes. Adding those principles to the basic system LAK0 will yield
more powerful logics of algorithmic knowledge. Let us consider some examples.
Assume that currently an agent i's explicit knowledge (his knowledge base)
is a set  = f
1
; : : : ; 
n
g of sentences. Let  be a propositional consequence of .
We cannot assume that i automatically knows , however simple the derivation
of  from  may be. To know , i has to perform some inferences, which take
some time. The amount of time needed to answer the query  can be estimated
with the help of complexity theory. Let m = k
1
k+ : : :+ k
n
k be the size of 
and l = kk be the size of . To determine if  is in fact a consequence of , our
agent may check if every truth-value assignment which falsies  also falsies
. There are at most 2
l
such assignments, and the time needed to check if an
assignment satises  is polynomial to the size of . Hence, i can reliably know 
in some time proportional to P (m)2
l
for some polynomial P . Let c
i
be a number
that measures the computation speed of i. Then the time the agent i needs to
infer  is t = c
i
P (m)2
l
, hence K
0
i

1
^ : : :K
0
i

n
! K
t
i
 is valid.
Interestingly, the previous analysis can be used by an agent within the system
in order to reason about other agents, provided that he has a built-in mechanism
to calculate the complexity of reasoning problems. An agent k can reason about
another agent i exactly like we did to expect i to know  within t = c
i
P (m)2
l
time units. But to estimate the time i would need to derive , k does not have
to actually derive it. He has only to calculate the complexity of , which can be
accomplished in a short time. So if 
1
^ : : : ^ 
n
!  is a propositional tautology
then we may infer K
0
k
K
0
i
(K
0
i

1
^ : : :K
0
i

n
)! K
t
k
k
K
t
i
, where t
k
is some fairly
small number (which depends on k's capacities).
What about self-introspection? Positive introspection is relatively easy, so
for any formula  we may adopt the axiom 8x(K
x
i
 ! K
x+1
i
K
x
i
), which says
that after proving , agent i may introspect his knowledge and discovers that
he knows . For negative introspection we cannot expect to have any axiom of
that generality, but we may still have some rules for special cases.
It is sometimes important to know not only what an agent knows, but also
what he does not know within a certain time limit. For instance, when we use
public-key cryptography to encrypt a message, we want to be sure that someone
without the secret key will not be able to know its content within reasonable
time | although he can in principle infer it from the public key. The expectation
that our message cannot be quickly decrypted is based on the complexity of the
reasoning required: we use lower complexity bounds to estimate the least amount
of time that an agent would need to infer some sentence, and so to infer what
he cannot reliably know within some given limit of time.
5 Conclusions
We have argued that existing agent theories are developed on inadequate epis-
temic foundations. We have then proposed a new epistemic concept, the concept
of algorithmic knowledge, which generalizes both notions of knowledge consid-
ered in the literature: that of explicit and that of implicit knowledge. Logics
of our concept of algorithmic knowledge have been developed following a clear
methodology. The main idea is to combine epistemic logic with a complexity
analysis: we consider how long an agent will need to compute the answer to a
certain query. It is shown that our approach can account adequately for our in-
tuitions about knowledge and that it solves the problems associated with other
approaches. In contrast to logics of implicit knowledge such as modal systems
or the deduction model, our logics can describe realistic, entirely non-omniscient
agents. But unlike logics of explicit knowledge, our systems are capable of de-
scribing rational agents, who can use their reasoning capacities to infer new
information from what they know. Moreover, our systems have a greater ex-
pressive power than most existing logics. For example, time constraints can be
expressed easily in our framework.
Currently there still exists a wide gap between agent theories and agents
existing in practice. Our work is an attempt to bridge this gap. We are trying to
develop theories of mental concepts that make much more realistic assumptions
about agents than other theories. Our work is guided by the principle that the
capacities attributed to agents must be implementable. Much remains to be done
to develop our framework further. But we rmly believe that our framework is
a very useful one, which can be used to represent the kind of knowledge needed
by agent theories better than any other existing logic of knowledge.
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